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Abstract – This contribution discusses algorithms for 
strong authentication of applications in mobile devices. 
The current LTE and IMS networks provide strong 
authentication using USIM smart cards based on AKA 
algorithm. The problem of this authentication is that 
this authentication is under the sole control of Telco 
operators. We can expect that more applications will be 
placed into the IMS environment in the future. These 
applications will be based either on SIP (video on 
demand etc.) or HTTP-based protocols (e.g. as 
government applications or banking applications etc.). 
They will be provided not only by Telco operators, but 
also especially by independent third parties - application 
(content) providers (e.g. government, banks etc.). This 
contribution proposes new authentication algorithms 
that combine AKA algorithm with other authentication 
algorithms. Therefore, the authentication is not under 
the sole control of Telco operators, still using strong 
authentication AKA protocol. 
Keywords - Authentication, AKA, Mobile Application, 
IMS, Robust Two-factor Authentication, Mobile 
authentication    
I.  INTRODUCTION 
At present, mobile applications use a number of 
authentication methods, e.g.:  
1. Native authentication methods in 3G/4G networks 
based on AKA mechanism [1]. This 
authentication is undoubtedly a cryptographically 
strong authentication. Its disadvantage is that it is 
used for authenticating of mobile device to the 
network (often called equipment authentication). 
2. Password authentication is typical user 
authentication. Generally, this authentication 
method is unfortunately considered weak, so 
applications such as home banking or eGov seek 
other mechanisms. 
3. Strong password authentication are more 
sophisticated password authentication methods 
resistant against known attacks (sniffing or 
elicitation of password, password-file 
compromise attack, guessing attack, forgery 
attack, impersonation attack, stolen-verifier 
attack, replay attack etc.).  
4. Authentication based on public key certificates 
(PKI). The problem is, where the mobile device 
securely stores the private keys. 
5. External devices such as authentication 
calculators generating one-time passwords. The 
main disadvantage of this solution is that a user 
must take care about an additional device, what 
he/she can find disagreeable. 
Using multiple authentication method 
independently does not increase security. Our idea is 
to combine (to breed) methods 1 and 3 in a common 
multifactor authentication. The first factor is an 
equipment authentication based on AKA mechanisms 
and the second factor is strong password 
authentication. 
II. USIM AND ISIM 
In the 4th generation of mobile networks (Figure 1), 
LTE (Network Long Term Evolution) provides 
communication between the mobile device and base 
station (eNB) at the link layer. The base stations (eNB) 
are connected to the core network EPC (Evolved 
Packet Core) that will ensure that mobile devices can 
communicate through the Mobility Management 
Entity (MME) to IP networks. At the application layer, 
the mobile device communicates with IMS network 
which provides multimedia services.  
The client authenticates towards LTE/EPC using 
the shared secret K, which he/she has stored in the 
Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) 
application on his/her Universal Integrated Circuit 
Card (UICC)by AKA mechanism. The network has 
the shared secrets stored in the Authentication Center 
(AuC) of LTE/EPC networks. The AKA 
authentication mechanism is used. 
At the application layer, the client authenticates 
towards IMS using the shared secret K that has stored 
in IP Multimedia Services Identity Module (ISIM) 
application to his/her Universal Integrated Circuit 
Card (UICC). The network has it stored in the AuC of 
IMS network. The authentication is also used AKA 
mechanism, however be encapsulated into another 
protocol. 
AuC is jointly operated with subscriber database 
by the Home Subscriber Server (HSS). 
 Generally, the shared secret K for LTE/EPC  is 
other than the IMS network. In practice, however 
client’s smart card often contains only application 
USIM and ISIM application do not, so they use the 
same shared secret for LTE/EPS and for the IMS 
network too. In that case, on the Telco side   AuC is 
common for LTE/EPC and for IMS. 
III. AKA MECHANISM 
AKA (Authentication and Key Agreement) 
mechanism  is a security protocol used in 3G/4G 
mobile networks for mutual authentication and 
cryptographic material agreement (Figure 2). 
There are three communication parties: 
– A (mobile), mobile equipment usually equipped 
with USIM/ISIM containing shared secret K. 
– B (network), usually A-SBC in IMS. 
– Authentication center (part of a Home 
Subscriber Server - HSS). 
Parties A (mobile) and Authentication center 
(AuC): 
– share a secret K (shared secret) different for 
each  smart card, 
– maintain sequence number SEQ of 
authentication. 
– Both parties support the AKA mechanism 
using one way functions f 1, f 2, f 3, f 4 and f5 
(Figure 3). 
AKA mechanism (Figure 2) is the following: 
AKA-1: A (mobile) will grant access (sends its 
identity to B). 
AKA-2: B (network) sends identification of A to 
Authentication center. 
 AKA-3: Authentication center on behalf of B: 
– Generates random number RAND. 
– Generates next sequence number SEQ of 
authentication. 
– Runs Authentication functions f 1−f 5. 
(Figure 3) and generates Authentication 
vector AV = (RAND, RES, CK, IK, 
SQN ⊕AK, AMF, MAC). While RES 
is one time password for authentication of 
A and MAC is one time password for 
authentication of B. 
– Sends AV to B. 
AKA-4: B cut and sore RES form Authentication 
vector AV. Next, RAND, SQN ⊕AK, AMF and 
MAC sends to A. 
TABLE 1 Notation of AKA mechanisms 
 
AKA-5: Through the function f5, A computes SQN. 
A runs the rest of authentication functions and: 
– If MAC, computed by A, is equal to MAC   
from AV, than B (network) is authenticated. 
Symbol Meaning 
  
K Shared secret 
AMF Well  known string 
SQN Sequence  number  of authentication 
RAND Random number 
MAC One time password for network authentication 
RES One time password for user equipment 
authentication 
CK Cyphering key 
IK Integrity key 
AK Anonymization key for SEQ anonymization 
f 1-f 5 One way functions  
Figure 1 Authentication in mobile networks 
 – Generates RES and sends it to B. 
AKA-6: B compares the RES, obtained from A, 
with saved RES from AV (step AKA-4). If 
equal, A is authenticated. 
 
IV. RELATED WORK 
Method combining Secure Hash-Based Password 
Authentication Protocol Using Smartcards [3] and 
AKA mechanism [1] was introduced in [2] This 
method supports: 
1. Multi-factor security - the security of the 
scheme is guaranteed when either the user’s 
password or his data bearer token or 
USIM/ISIM is compromised, but not all. 
2. Content provider keeps control over 
authentication to its applications. 
3. Authentication is associated with USIM/ISIM 
i.e. AKA mechanisms used. 
4. Roaming support - authentication is possible 
both in a home network and in a visited 
network. 
5. Password change - a user can freely update 
his/her password. 
6. Password change without communication with a 
server 
- a user can freely update his/her password 
without any interaction with a server. 
7. Mutual authentication - a user and a server 
are sure about the identity of each other. Both 
the server and the user can verify the legality 
of its counterpart.  
8. No time synchronization - The scheme does 
not require additional clock synchronization   
mechanisms 
9. Anti-desynchronization both a user and a 
server cannot be desynchronized against 
their shared secrets or values, which could 
result in the user’s denial of any future access 
to the server. 
10. Data bearer revocation. In the case of data 
bearer token loss, invalidating the further 
use of the lost data bearer token should be 
provided to prevent an adversary from 
Figure 3  
Figure 2 AKA mechanism 
 impersonating the registered user with the 
lost s data bearer token. 
11. Password protection (eavesdropping, elicitation 
etc.) - except the user, no another party can get 
any information of the user’s password. More 
specially, the user’s password will not be 
revealed to the server during registration, and 
there are no variation tables such as plain text or 
hashed passwords stored in the server. 
 
Method described in [2] has some disadvantages. 
The method does not supports: 
12. Session key agreement - A session key is 
established between the user and the server 
during the authentication process, which is 
known only to the user and the server. Then, 
the session key is used to create a secure 
communication channel between the user 
and the server. 
13. Perfect forward secrecy - a potential attacker 
cannot know any information about 
previously established session key, even 
when the long-term keys of the server and 
the user are disclosed. 
14. Forward and backward secrecy - Forward 
secrecy means, that even though for some 
reason some session keys are exposed, the 
secrecy of any previous session key will be 
still maintained. Backward secrecy means, 
that even though some previous session keys 
are exposed, the secrecy of any future  
session key will be still maintained. 
15. Key freshness.  Neither party can guess the 
next shared session key. 
V. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION 
The proposed solution (Figure 4) creates multifactor 
authentication by merging AKA authentication 
mechanism [1] and Robust Two-factor Authentication 
[4]. Assume that the user is registered: 
– In terms of Robust Two-factor 
Authentication: Parameter Generation phase 
was done. Mobile user U and Application 
function S (server) exchange messages R1 
and R2. 
– In terms of AKA mechanism [1]: A user 
equipped with USIM shares the secret K 
with Authentication Center (AuC). 
In the proposed solution, the mobile user U and the 
Application function S during authentication 
exchange three messages Y1, Y2 and Y3: 
Step Y1: U inserts its data bearer token with 
parameters IM0 and V into its equipment and 
inputs its password PW. Next, a random integer 
rC from [1, n − 1] is generated and GC=rC × G is 
computed. Then it continues to compute V’=V–
H(PW) = H(ID∥KS) and G’C=GC+V’. At the 
end, U sends its identity (for AKA mechanisms) 
and {IM0,G’C} to S. 
Step Y2: This step consists of the step A1 (Robust 
Two-factor Authentication) and the steps 
AKA1, AKA2 and AKA3. Upon receiving 
message Y1, S asks AuC for AV generation for 
the user U. AuC sends AV to S. S cuts off RES 
from AV and stores it.  
In the meantime, S handles message {IM0,G’C}, S 
decrypts the parameter IM0 with KS and obtains 
the value ID∥r. Then, S verifies whether the 
identifier ID is valid. If the verification fails, S 
terminates the session. Otherwise, S computes 
V’=H(ID∥KS) and recovers GC=G’C-V’.  
After that, S generates GC=G’C-V’, where rS is a 
random integer within range [1, n − 1], and then 
computes IM1=EKs(ID∥r’), 
KSU=h1(H(ID∥KS)(rS×GC)), IM’1=h(KSU) ⊕ IM1 
and MS=h2(KSU∥GC∥GS∥IM’1∥MAC-A).  
S sends  to  U:  MS, GS, IM’1, RAND, SQN⊕AK 
and AMF . 
Step Y3: First, U’s equipment runs function f5 and 
obtains SEQ. Subsequently, it runs function f1, 
f2, f3 and f4 and obtains MAC, RES and 
cryptographic material IK, CK. 
Upon  receiving  {MS,GS,IM’1},  the  U’s  
equipment computes the session key 
KSU=h1(V’∥(rC×GS)) and then, it checks whether 
the value MS is equal to 
h2(KSU∥GC∥GS∥IM’1∥MAC-A). If it is not, it 
terminates this session. Otherwise, it computes 
IM1=h(KSU) ⊕ IM’1   and  replaces  IM0  by  IM1,  
then,  it computes MU=h2(KSU∥GS∥RES) and sends 
{MU} to S. 
Step Y4: Upon receiving {MU}, S checks whether 
the value MU is equal to h2(KSU∥GS∥XRES). If 
yes, U and S successfully authenticate each 
other and share the session key. Otherwise, S 
terminates this session. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 Notation of Robust Two-factor Authentication 
Symbol Meaning 
p A  large  prime 
E An elliptic curve equation over Zp 
Fp Finite field with notions of  addition (+), 
subtraction (-), multiplication (x) and division 
G A generator point of a large order 
S Server 
U User 
ID Login ID of U 
PW  PW Password of U 
Ekey(m) Encryption of message m with key 
Dkey(m)  Decryption of message m with key 
h1(); h2(); 
h3()  
Cryptographic hash function 
H()  Cryptographic map-to-point (on elliptic curve) 
hash function, e.g.  [5] 
⊕ Denotes the bitwise XOR operation 
∥ Denotes concatenation 
 
 
  
 
 
 
VI. ANALYSIS 
Table 3 compares properties of the described 
algorithm. Table 4 summarizes the computation 
costs comparison between our scheme and the 
previous schemes (in authentication phase). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 4 Proposed solution 
 TABLE 3 Properties of the described algorithms 
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1 Multi-factor security Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 Content provider maintains control over authentication to its  
applications 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 Authentication is associated with USIM/ISIM Yes No No Yes Yes
4 Roaming support Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
5 Password change n/a Yes Yes Yes Yes
6 Password change without any interaction with the  server n/a No Yes No Yes
7 Mutual authentication Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
8 No time synchronization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
9 Anti de-synchronization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
10 Data bearer revocation n/a Yes Yes Yes Yes
11 Password protection (eavesdropping, elicitation etc.) n/a Yes Yes Yes Yes
12 Session key agreement Yes No Yes No Yes
13 Perfect  forward secrecy n/a n/a Yes No Yes
14 Forward and backward secrecy n/a n/a Yes No Yes
15 Key freshness n/a n/a Yes No Yes
 
TABLE 4 Computation costs 
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Computation costs of the user 4h, 1A 3h, 1H, 2PM 4h, 1A, AKA 3h, 1H, 2PM,  AKA
Computation costs 
server 
of the 4h, 2A 4h, 1H, 2S, 2PM 4h,2A, AKA 4h, 1H, 2S, 2PM, AKA
Communication round be- 
tween the user and server 
3 3 3 3 
 
- h is defined as the time complexity of the hash computation; 
- H is defined as the map-to-point hash computation; 
- S is defined as the time complexity of the symmetric 
encryption/decryption; 
 
- PM is defined as the time complexity of the EC point 
multiplication; 
- A is defined as the time complexity of the asymmetric (e.g. 
RSA) encryption/decryption. 
- AKA is defined as the time complexity of the AKA algorithm 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The proposed solution enables applications, running 
on IMS environments to use authentication, which 
brings: 
– Evidence that the user is authenticated in the 
device that he/she uses, with the particular 
USIM (proof of ownership). 
– Evidence that a concrete person who knows 
the password performed the authentication. 
– Generating cryptographic material for 
securing subsequent communication 
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